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Finland experienced an extremely severe economic depression in the early 1990s. 
In the midst of this crisis, significant new legislation was passed that increased 
supervisory powers of financial market regulators and reformed bankruptcy 
procedures, significantly decreasing the protection of creditors. We show that the 
introduction of these new laws resulted in positive abnormal stock returns. The 
new laws also lead to increases in firms’ Tobin’s q, especially for more levered 
firms. In contrast to previous studies, our results also suggest that public 
supervision of financial markets fosters rather than hampers financial market 
development. 
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Feeniks-lintu nousee: Lakiuudistukset ja yritysten 
arvostusten muutos Suomen 1990-luvun suuressa 
lamassa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 1/2007 
Timo Korkeamäki – Yrjö Koskinen – Tuomas Takalo 




Suomen sodanjälkeinen kasvun kausi päättyi 1990-luvun alussa rajuun talouskrii-
siin. Kriisin keskellä toteutettiin monia merkittäviä sijoittajansuojaa koskevia laki-
uudistuksia: esimerkiksi sekä rahoitustarkastus- että yrityssaneerauslainsäädäntö 
uudistettiin perusteellisesti. Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, kuinka osakemarkki-
nat reagoivat positiivisesti lakiuudistuksiin ja kuinka yritysten, erityisesti velkai-
sen, arvostus koheni lakiuudistuksen myötä. Vastoin aikaisempia tutkimuksia, 
julkinen rahoitustarkastus tämän tutkimuksen mukaan pikemminkin edistää kuin 
haittaa rahoitusmarkkinoiden kehitystä. 
 
Avainsanat: hyvä hallintotapa, konkurssi, rahoitustarkastus, sijoittajansuoja, poli-
tiikan taloustiede, kriisin hallinta 
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Finland went through an economic depression in the early 1990s that was 
unprecedented in its severity for a highly developed modern economy
1. An 
integral part of this depression was a banking crisis, where the government was 
forced to give massive bailouts to all the banks and to guarantee their contractual 
obligations. At the end of this crisis, one banking group was liquidated and two 
major banks were forced to merge. Finland’s bank-dominated financial system 
was in ruins. 
  Between 1991 and 1993, during the crisis, the government introduced new 
laws that resulted in complete transformation of the country’s financial system. 
The change in securities law improved the integrity of the stock markets by 
establishing the new Financial Supervisory Authority with enhanced resources 
and regulatory powers. The other central piece of the legislation was a new 
bankruptcy procedure that made the reorganization of companies easier, mirroring 
the US Chapter 11 process. The legal reforms improved the enforcement of 
shareholders’ rights while weakening creditors’ rights. By the end of 1990s a new 
financial system had emerged, based on more prominent role for the stock market 
and less dependence on banks.
2 
  The introduction of the new bankruptcy and securities laws provides us a 
unique opportunity to study how changes in creditor and shareholder protection 
affect corporate valuations. Typically, the relationship between investor protection 
laws and corporate valuations is studied using cross-sectional multi-country 
regressions (see for example La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
2002). Those regressions are open to criticism of reverse causality: it is plausible 
that higher valuations lead to better investor protection laws. In addition, cross-
sectional regressions can potentially lead to spurious findings due to numerous 
macroeconomic factors that are difficult to control for in the empirical design. We 
address these problems by employing the short-term event study method in 
addition to estimating panel regressions. Results obtained from short-term event 
studies are less likely to suffer from omitted macroeconomic variables potentially 
biasing results. The fact that our short-term event study and panel data estimation 
                                                 
1 From 1990 to 1993 the GDP per capita declined by 14 percent and the unemployment shot up 
from 3 per cent of labor force up to 20 per cent (see Honkapohja and Koskela, 2000, for further 
details). 
2 See Hyytinen, Kuosa, and Takalo (2003) for further details.  
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produce internally consistent results eases the concern about omitted variable bias 
in the latter.
3 
  The effect on corporate valuations of the decrease in creditor protection due to 
the bankruptcy reform is ambiguous a priori. On one hand, strong creditor 
protection can mean that illiquid but viable companies face a risk of unnecessary 
liquidation in bankruptcy processes. Therefore, weakening creditor protection 
could lead to increased share values. Similarly, a wealth transfer from creditors to 
shareholders would cause a positive stock price reaction. On the other hand, there 
is evidence that strong creditor protection is associated with strong shareholder 
protection and broader financial markets (La Porta et al, 1997) and that credit 
institutions and stock markets are complements in supporting economic growth 
(Levine, 2001). In particular, good creditor protection should improve availability 
of debt finance, which had been a major source of external finance in Finland. 
Thus a drastic weakening of creditor rights might constrain firms financially and 
therefore affect the value of common stock negatively. 
  Similar ambiguity applies to the effects of the creation of the Financial 
Supervisory Authority. It is widely thought that stronger supervisory powers of 
financial market regulators nurture financial market development. This notion 
underlies the second pillar of the Basel II financial market regulations. However, 
the positive effects arising from the establishment of Financial Supervisory 
Authority can also be questioned: the recent literature suggests that strengthening 
public supervision is at best irrelevant for financial market development (Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine, 2004, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006). 
Hence the question of whether any of the reforms considered in this study 
increase or decrease corporate valuation is ultimately empirical. 
  We employ company level data from Worldscope, Helsinki Stock Exchange 
and Compustat spanning the years 1989 to 1993. First, we utilize the event study 
method and examine whether the legal changes result in abnormal returns for a 
portfolio of Finnish companies. We do not detect a market reaction when the 
newspapers first report that the government is considering new securities or 
corporate laws. Most likely, the first piece of news regarding the content of the 
planned legislation is so vague that the market reaction is muted for this reason.
4 
However, we find a positive stock market reaction when the bills are first 
introduced to the parliament. This result applies to both improved enforcement of 
                                                 
3 There is also a large literature that studies the relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance measures and stock returns or valuations. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) show that investing in better governed firms earns superior returns and that better governed 
firms trade at higher valuations. However, also papers that study the relationship between firm-
level governance and valuations suffer from reverse causality: low valuations may lead to bad 
governance. Indeed, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2006) show that after controlling for prior valuations, 
there is no relationship between contemporaneous valuations and firm-level corporate governance. 
4 The muted reaction is also in line with previous event studies on the effects of law changes such 
as Binder (1985), which point out the difficulties in specifying the appropriate first event date.  
9 
shareholders’ rights (establishment of the new Financial Supervisory Authority) 
and weakening of creditors’ rights (the new bankruptcy procedures). Our results 
regarding creditor right changes could in principle imply either a wealth transfer 
from creditors to shareholders, or alternatively a net positive wealth creation. We 
find support for the wealth creation hypothesis by showing that also financial 
institutions – by far the most important creditors in Finland during the time of the 
reforms – experienced a positive stock market reaction. In contrast to Barth et al 
(2004, 2006) and La Porta et al (2006) we find evidence that public enforcement 
of securities laws also matters, as the creation of the Supervisory Authority is met 
by a positive stock reaction. 
  There is no market reaction when the parliament passes the laws. When the 
government introduces the legislation to the parliament the laws are 
fundamentally in their final forms, thus resulting in significant market reactions. 
Since Finland had a strong majority government at the time of the reforms, the 
final passing of the laws was just a mere formality with no new informational 
content. 
  In seeking the determinants of the abnormal returns, we find that levered 
firms experience more positive abnormal returns when laws that weaken 
creditors’ rights are introduced to the parliament. This result suggests that 
stockholders of more levered firms reap greater benefits from the new, more 
lenient bankruptcy procedures. Lastly, we study the effects of the four legal 
reforms considered on Tobin’s q. Our panel regression results confirm that more 
levered firms experience higher valuations as a result of the legal reforms. 
  Besides supporting the connection between law and finance, we also 
contribute to the recent political economy literature that considers motivations 
behind legal reforms (Pagano and Volpin, 2005, 2006, Perotti and von Thadden, 
2006). It can be argued that the far reaching corporate governance reforms in 
Finland were made possible by the deep crisis that caused labor to lose its rents.
5 
This reduced labor’s incentive (and ability) to resist reforms. The reforms were 
passed under a right-wing government that did not include – for the first time in 
25 years – left-wing parties closely associated with labor unions. 
  Besides labor unions, the banks had traditionally been an influential interest 
group in Finland. The worsening of creditor rights was thought to run against their 
interests. However, the banking crisis and subsequent reorganization of the 
banking sector meant a deterioration of banks’ previously strong industrial and 
political power. For example, the Act on Reorganization of Companies was 
adopted despite protests by the Finnish Bankers’ Association (whose objection to 
the Act is documented in Government bill 182/1992). In sum, the financial crisis 
in Finland significantly worsened the bargaining power of two powerful interest 
                                                 
5 This loss is manifested by the above-mentioned change in unemployment, from 3% in 1990 to 
20% in 1993 (cf. footnote 1).  
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groups, labor and banking sector, which seemed to open the door for more 
shareholder friendly legislation. 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews the legal changes in 
Finland that occurred during the crisis years. Section three provides a discussion 
of the connection between investor protection and stock valuation. Section four 
presents the data and section five the results. Section six discusses the political 
economy implications, and section seven concludes. 
 
 
2  Changes in investor protection in Finland 
2.1  Legal and institutional background before the reforms 
of 1991–1993 
The Finnish legal system has developed in close connection with other Nordic 
countries. Especially Swedish legislation has been influential due to Finland’s 
union with Sweden which lasted for more than 700 years. Since the 1980s, the 
strong Nordic influence on Finnish regulations has been replaced by cooperation 
within the European Union. 
  Like the other Nordic countries, Finland was highly advanced in terms of 
overall legal development at the start of the 1980s. As Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) report, the International Country Risk Guide gave Finland the 
highest possible score for the years preceding the economic crisis, 1985–1991, in 
its law and order index, which measures reliance on the legal system in mediating 
disputes and enforcing contracts. The IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 
placed Finland fourth in 1990 on fair administration of justice (IMD, 1990). The 
level of the legal system has remained excellent also after the economic crisis. 
Finland is ranked fifth in the IMD yearbook of 2005 for the state of the general 
legal and regulatory framework.
6 The World Economic Foundation’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2004–2005 generally echoes these results, placing 
Finland first in the general growth competitiveness index and emphasizing 
judicial independence and property rights as major sources of competitive 
advantage (Porter, Schwab, Sala-i-Martin, and Lopez-Claros, 2004). 
  Although the foundations of the legal system were solid, Hyytinen et al 
(2003) document that Finnish legislation concerning minority shareholder 
protection, based on The Companies Act of 1978, was underdeveloped in the 
1980s. The main determinants of creditor rights before the reforms in the early 
                                                 
6 Regarding the fair administration of justice, Finland’s score in the 1990 World Competitiveness 
Yearbook is 84.17 (of 100) and in the 2005 Yearbook 8.75 (of 10). Finland’s score regarding the 
state of the legal and regulator framework in the 2005 Yearbook is 6.82 (of 10).  
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1990s in Finland were the more than century-old Liquidation Bankruptcy Code of 
1868, and the Act on Compositions of 1932. Until 1993, the principal route of 
resolution of financial distress was liquidation bankruptcy. When a firm was 
declared bankrupt, a trustee took over the firm and sold its assets. The firm could 
either have been sold as a going-concern or liquidated piecemeal. The proceeds 
were then distributed to creditors according to priority of claims. The Liquidation 
Bankruptcy Code of 1868 was amended after its initial passing, but the changes 
were minor compared to the reforms considered in this study. Workouts, or 
compositions established by a court, provided an alternative way of resolution 




2.2 Legal  reforms in 1991–1993 
During the early 1990s, the government implemented a number of reforms of the 
Finnish economic and financial system. We focus on the changes in investor 
protection legislation that can be captured by indexes developed by La Porta et al 
(1997, 1998), Pistor (2000), and Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000).
7 
  Three pieces of legislation affecting creditor rights were passed in 1991 and 
1992: the Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy 758/1991 (effective January 
1, 1992), the Act on Claim Priorities 1578/1992 (effective January 1, 1993), and 
the Act on Reorganization of Companies 47/1993 (effective February 8, 1993). 
Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy extended the time limits when pre-
bankruptcy transactions could be revoked. The Act on Claim Priorities simplified 
priority rules in liquidation. The Act on Reorganization of Companies introduced 
court supervised reorganization for financially distressed firms. As Ravid and 
Sundgren (1998) demonstrate, it is similar to the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
procedure. 
  The Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority 503/1993 (effective June 11, 
1993) significantly increased the resources and the regulatory powers of financial 
supervision. In addition, it unified the dispersed banking supervision to one 
organization, which operates in connection with the Bank of Finland. 
  These reforms altered La Porta et al’s and Pistor et al’s index values as 
follows: 
 
–  The Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy of 1991 improved creditors’ 
rights, as measured by an increase in Pistor et al’s index for creditors’ legal 
possibilities to punish management (REMEDY) index from 1.5 to 2 (max 3). 
                                                 
7 See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion.  
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–  The Act on Financial Supervisory Authority of 1993 improved shareholder 
protection, as measured by an increase in the value of Pistor et al’s stock 
market integrity index (SMINTEGR) from 5 to 6 (max 6). 
–  The Act on Reorganization of Companies of 1993 weakened creditors’ rights, 
as measured by a decrease in La Porta et al’s creditor right index from 4 to 1 
(max 4), the extended La Porta et al’s creditor right index from 4 to 1 (max 
5),
8 and Pistor et al’s index for creditors’ control of the bankruptcy 
(CREDCON) from 3 to 1 (max 5). 
 
As the indices suggest, the Act on Reorganization of Companies in 1993 was 
detrimental for creditor protection. The reform weakened the restrictions on going 
into reorganization and expanded the scope of the automatic stay on assets. It also 
diluted creditor rights by enabling management to remain in charge during the 
reorganization. Since a purpose of Pistor et al’s CREDCON is to create a La Porta 
et al – type creditor right index that is useful in circumstances where legislation 
does not recognize the US style reorganization, it provides a robustness check for 
our coding. Because this index value also drops, we can be more confident that 
the Act on Reorganization of Companies drastically weakened creditor protection. 
  As a result of the deterioration of creditor rights, Finnish legislation currently 
provides a lower level of creditor protection than most common or civil law 
countries, as reported in La Porta et al (1997, 1998). The score of 1 for Finland in 
2000 is lower than the world average of 2.3 and the Nordic average of 2.0. Prior 
to 1993, the score for Finland was 4. The comparisons to La Porta et al results 
should, however, be interpreted cautiously, because the legislation may also have 
been changed in other countries. 
  Other creditor rights measures have remained strong or even improved. 
Measured by Pistor et al’s index for collateral rules (COLLAT), Finnish 
legislation continues to provide a maximum level of investor protection. Due to 
the passing of the Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy in 1991, it has 
become easier to nullify transactions that preceded the initiation of bankruptcy 
proceedings. The Act increased possibilities to punish the management (as 
measured by Pistor et al’s REMEDY-index). 
  The Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority of 1993 enhanced 
shareholder protection, albeit indirectly, by improving the enforcement of existing 
regulation. However, effects of such supervisory improvements have been 
questioned in existing literature. A reason for the establishment of the new 
Financial Supervisory Authority was the lack of resources in the old Banking 
                                                 
8 The extended La Porta et al’s creditor right index was initiated by Pistor (2000) and Pistor et al 
(2000). This index adds to La Porta et al’s creditor right index a discrete variable for the provision 
for a legal reserve, ie, the minimum percentage of total shares required to avoid dissolution of the 
company. This variable appears originally also in La Porta et al (1997, 1998) but is not a part of 
their index.  
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Supervision, which hampered the effective supervision of the Finnish banking and 
financial system in the 1980s. 
 
 
3  Investor protection and stock values 
As described in the Introduction, the valuation effects of legal changes that took 
place in Finland are ex ante ambiguous. First, creditor right reductions and 
shareholder protection improvements could produce positive stock reactions. 
Stock values could rise either through wealth transfer from creditors to 
shareholders, or through wealth creation by relaxation of overly stringent creditor 
rights and improving shareholder protection. Accordingly, our observed stock 
prices should react positively to three law changes out of the four that we study, 
since two of them represent a decrease in creditor rights and one is an increase in 
shareholder protection. The Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy of 1991 
marks an improvement in creditor rights, so that the stock price reaction to that 
law should be negative. Similarly, we would expect that Tobin’s q increases in the 
panel data estimations using annual data, especially for more levered firms. 
  However, reductions in creditor rights could constrain firms financially, 
resulting in a net value loss. This would imply a negative stock price reaction to 
the two dilutions of the creditor rights, and a positive reaction to the creditor right 
improvement. One could also argue that the creation of the Financial Supervisory 
Authority further constrains financing. In addition, stock values could also suffer 
if the demand for equity by controlling shareholders is reduced due to diminished 
access to control benefits (see Giannetti and Koskinen, 2005). 
  The above discussion implies that weakening of creditor rights and the 
creation of the Financial Supervisory Authority can also have opposite effects on 
financial market development: the former having a positive and the latter a 
negative effect or vice versa. 
  In sum, signing the effects of the legal changes a priori is difficult, as each of 
them can go either way. We therefore first explore the effects with the event study 
methodology, which allows identification of law change-specific events, before 




4 Data  description 
We utilize two different main data sources. Our Finnish stock return data were 
obtained directly from the Helsinki Stock Exchange. That data set contains the 
entire universe of Finnish publicly traded firms. The accounting data that we use 
in the cross sectional analysis comes from Worldscope. Since the Worldscope 
coverage is limited compared to our returns data, our sample size varies 
depending on which tests we perform. However, our return results are robust to 
exclusion of firms that are not part of the Worldscope sample. 
  Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for our Worldscope sample across 
the five years (1989–1993) included in this study. Panel A contains the entire 
sample, and Panel B includes only firms that are present in all five sample years. 
Notably, the medians of revenues and assets in Panel A have significantly 
decreased during our sample, as smaller companies have entered the Worldscope 
dataset each year. According to both Panels A and B, following the drastic 
reduction in creditor protection leverage (calculated as long-term debt divided by 
total assets) dropped significantly from 1992 to 1993. Panel C indicates that our 
sample is dominated by manufacturing and financial sectors. 
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Table 1.   Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Median Values – Full Sample    
  Number of obs.  Revenues  Assets  Leverage  Tobin’s q 
1989  61  1,353   1,768   0.233  1.168 
1990  69  1,126   1,222   0.256  1.013 
1991  79  768   1,010   0.303  0.981 
1992  83  646   732   0.299  0.984 
1993  88  593   778   0.240  1.168 
          
Panel B: Median Values – Balanced Panel    
  Number of obs.  Revenues  Assets  Leverage  Tobin’s q 
1989  57  1,353   1,768   0.233  1.168 
1990  57  1,558   2,290   0.256  1.015 
1991  57  1,558   2,197   0.288  0.985 
1992  57  1,721   1,998   0.287  0.992 
1993  57  1,957   1,959   0.207  1.178 
          
Panel C: Industry Distribution – Balanced Panel   
Mining     1     
Construction   3     
Manufacturing   27     
Transportation   4     
Wholesale Trade    4     
Retail Trade    3     
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate  12     
Services     3    
Panels A and B report sample medians by observation year. Revenues = net sales in FIM millions, 
assets = total assets in FIM millions, and leverage = long-term debt/total assets. Tobin’s q = (total 
assets – book value of common stock + market capitalization)/total assets. 
 
 
We also report the median Tobin’s q values for our sample in Table 1. We 
calculate Tobin’s q according to equation (4.1). If the reductions in creditor 
protection result in wealth transfers from creditors to stockholders, we would 
expect to observe economy-wide increases in Tobin’s q. As Panel B of Table 1 
shows, we detect an improvement of almost 19% in Tobin’s q between 1992 and 
1993 for firms in our balanced panel. In fairness, it should be noted that the result 
for 1993 indicates a return in Tobin’s q values to the pre-crisis levels of 1989. The 
lack of improvements in Tobin’s q over the entire sample horizon could be 
explained by the severity of the economic crisis. 
 





5.1 Event  study  results 
We begin a more rigorous analysis by conducting an event study around events 
related to the four law changes that we study. For each law change, we identify 
three dates of interest – 1) the first announcement date identifying the first 
mention of each law in Kauppalehti, the leading Finnish daily business 
newspaper, 2) the date when each law change was introduced by the government 
to the parliament, and 3) the date when the law was enacted by the parliament.
9 
  As documented in Hyytinen et al (2003) the Finnish stock market was 
relatively small in size and liquidity in the early 1990s. Our event window of  
(–2,  +1) should allow time for any new information to be assessed. Also, by 
including two trading days prior to the public announcement, we hope to capture 
information leakages prior to the events. Potential for such leakages exists in 
markets where information amongst market participants may be superior to that 
observable by the general public (or a researcher). 
  Common with prior research into law changes, such as Binder (1985), and 
several others, we have an extreme case of event date clustering amongst our 
sample firms, which is likely to cause the abnormal returns to be correlated in the 
cross-section. Therefore, we are unable to test for significance using the 
‘traditional’ event study methodology as outlined by Brown and Warner (1985). 
When the entire sample shares the event date, Schwert (1981) and Campbell, Lo, 
and MacKinlay (1997) suggest aggregating individual stock returns into a 
portfolio and analyzing abnormal returns of that portfolio. We follow their 
suggestion and compile an equally-weighted portfolio of all stock returns 
available around each of our events.
10 This ‘portfolio method’ is also used by Ali 
and Kallapur (2001), Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) and others. The abnormal 
returns for our portfolio are measured by the coefficient β2 in equation (5.1). 
 
ε + β + β + α = + − ) 1 , 2 ( 2 t , mkt 1 t , pf D R R  (5.1) 
 
                                                 
9 We also considered several other events related to each law, such as the steps that the law 
proposals took through the parliament committees. Not surprisingly, those events did not convey 
new information to the market, evidenced by insignificant event study results. Also, the press 
coverage of each law after the first announcement was largely inconsequential, judged by 
abnormal returns. 
10 Using equal weights in Finland would be problematic for more recent years due to the relative 
size of Nokia. However, in our 1989 sample Nokia has only third largest market capitalization.  
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where 
Rpf = Return on the equally-weighted Finnish stock portfolio on day t; 
Rmkt = Return on the MSCI World index on day t; 
D(–2,+1) = Dummy variable that takes on value of one during the event window, 
zero otherwise. 
 
For each event, we use trading days (−250, −10) as the estimation period. In other 
words, we include (−250,  −10) in each estimation, while excluding the days 
leading into each event (–9, –3). For the market portfolio (Rmkt), we use the MSCI 
World index. Our findings are essentially identical if we use alternative European 
indices instead. 
 
Table 2.   Analysis of stock reactions to law change events 
 
 CAR  t-statistic 
The act on restitution of assets in bankruptcy of 1991    
First announcement  0.0022  0.4077 
Introduction to the parliament  0.0044  0.8729 
Enactment 0.0014  0.3511 
    
The act on claim priorities of 1993    
First announcement  0.0045  0.9015 
Introduction to the parliament*  0.0209*** 3.8111 
Enactment -0.0006  -0.0928 
    
The act on financial supervisory authority of 1993    
First announcement  0.0105*** 3.0356 
Introduction to the parliament  0.0178*** 2.6430 
Enactment -0.0174**  -2.2293 
    
The act on reorganization of companies of 1993    
First announcement  -0.0022  -0.5364 
Introduction to the parliament*  0.0209*** 3.8111 
Enactment -0.0018  -0.2449 
* these two laws were introduced to the parliament on the same day.   
    
CARs are estimated using equation Rpf,t = α + β1Rmkt,t + β2D(–2,+1) + ε 
 
The market portfolio is the MSCI World index. The data included in each regression covers 
days (–250, –10) and (–2,+1), and the dummy variable D(–2,+1) takes on value of 1 during the 
event window of (–2,+1), zero otherwise. First announcements are identified from 
Kauppalehti, and the dates of Introduction the parliament and Enactment by the parliament 
are obtained from the Finnish Parliament. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at one 





The abnormal portfolio returns are presented in Table 2. We report the β2 
coefficient and the t-statistic for each event. If reductions in creditor protection 
and increases in shareholder protection are positive news to the stock market, the 
stock prices should react positively to three law changes out of the four that we 
consider, since two of the four law changes represent a reduction in creditor rights 
and one represents an improvement in shareholder protection. The Act on 
Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy of 1991 represents an improvement in 
creditor rights. Thus, we expect the stock price to react negatively to that law. 
  Only one of the first announcements is met by a statistically significant stock 
reaction. This can be explained either by the events having no effect to the stock 
returns, or by the difficulty in observing the true event date in a market where the 
news may leak to market participants prior to public announcements. 
  However, introduction to the parliament is accompanied by a significant 
positive reaction in all of the three cases where we expect a positive reaction.
11 
The date when the law is introduced to the parliament is the first date when a full 
version of the law is available to the public. While this is only the first 
introduction of the law, we emphasize that during our sample period, the parties in 
the Finnish government held a solid majority of the seats in the parliament, and 
therefore the eventual final version of the law was likely to be almost identical to 
the one that was originally introduced. It is also worth noting that two of our four 
law changes share the date of introduction to the parliament (September 25, 
1992), one of those two law changes being the one that brought about the most 
significant reduction in creditor protection, namely the Act on Reorganization of 
Companies of 1993. 
  Given the strong majority government, the date when the law is enacted by 
the parliament is likely to be of limited importance in terms of conveyance of new 
information. Indeed, only one of the four enactment events is met by a significant 
reaction. Namely, the reaction to the Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority 
exhibits a negative sign. 
  Next, we analyze the cross-sectional determinants of individual cumulative 
abnormal returns around each event in Table 3. We estimate firm-specific 
cumulative abnormal returns, again using the estimation period of (–250, –10), 
and the event window of (–2,+1). We continue to use the MSCI World Index as 
the market portfolio.
12 Each column of Table 3 represents one of the four law 
changes. The dependent variable in each column is the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) of the three events related to each law; the first announcement, the 
introduction to the parliament, and the final enactment of the law. In testing 
whether the marginal effect of leverage around a law-change event affects the 
stock reaction to that event, our test variables are the interaction variables between 
                                                 
11 Using the MVRM method as outlined by Binder (1985) gives quantitatively similar results. 
12 The use of alternative market portfolios leaves our findings intact.  
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leverage and the event dummy. In each specification, we control for whether the 
firm is a financial institution, and for the firm’s leverage, market-to-book, size 
(measured as log of assets), and dividend payout ratio. The financial institution 
dummy is intended to represent not only the difference in the balance sheet 
structure between financial and non-financial firms, but also the special role that 
financial institutions play as creditors. Market-to-book is set to control for 
potentially different reaction in industries with higher market multiples. The size 
variable controls for any difference in small vs. large firm stock reactions. Finally, 
the dividend payout ratio proxies the financial constraints of the firm, in the spirit 
of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). All firm-specific variables are observed 
in the year-end preceding the event date. 
  While leverage does not appear to affect the stock reactions to the other three 
law changes, the reactions to both the first announcement and the introduction to 
the parliament of the Act on Claim Priorities of 1993 are significantly affected by 
















        
Constant -0.0946**  -0.0350 -0.0073  -0.0862 
  (-1.976) (-0.331)  (-0.152) (-0.882) 
Leverage -0.0657  -0.2475***  0.0232  -0.0064 
  (-1.098) (-4.746)  (0.425) (-0.094) 
Foreign listing  -0.0033  -0.0047  0.0303*  -0.0224 
  (-0.288) (-0.202)  (1.929) (-1.025) 
Institution 0.0063  0.0105 0.0127  -0.0026 
  (0.764) (0.477)  (0.926) (-0.124) 
Market to book  -0.0009  -0.0006  0.0035  -0.2844 
  (-0.770) (-0.333)  (1.001) (-0.976) 
Log(assets) 0.0081**  0.0079  -0.0023  0.0068 
  (2.481) (1.061)  (-0.672) (0.976) 
Dividend payout  -0.0004 0.0006  0.0031 0.0060 
  (-0.519) (0.421)  (0.862) (1.174) 
First announcement  -0.0239  -0.0633*** 0.0171  0.0438 
  (-1.046) (-2.515)  (0.689)  (1.058) 
Intro -0.0162  -0.0858**  0.0789***  -0.0021 
  (-0.657) (-2.467)  (3.297) (-0.060) 
Leverage x First ann.  0.1074  0.2790*** 0.0830  -0.1760 
  (1.273) (3.412)  (1.239) (-1.474) 
Leverage x Introduction  0.0559  0.3746*** -0.0177  0.1201 
  (0.549) (3.083)  (-0.278) (0.973) 
Adj. R-sq  -0.0216  0.0717 0.1962  0.0552 
F-test p-value  0.641 0.046  0.000 0.082 
n  102 124  127 126 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the (–2,+1) CAR. Each column represents one of 
the four law changes considered. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets, 
foreign listing = 1 for firms that are listed on an exchange outside Finland, Institution = 1 for 
lending institutions, Market to book = market capitalization/book value of equity, Dividend payout 
= Cash dividends/EBT. Log(assets) is the natural log of total assets. First announcement and 
Introduction are dummy variables taking on the value of one for each type of event, law 
enactment serves as a control group in each specification. Leverage x First ann. and Leverage x 
Introduction are interaction variables between the two stated variables. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using White (1980) standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at one per cent, five per cent, and ten per cent level, respectively. 
 
 
5.2  Panel regression results 
Another way to observe the effect of creditor protection on the stock values is to 
measure changes in Tobin’s q during the period of law changes. In Table 4, we 
report results from panel data estimation, where we have used measures related to 
Tobin’s q as dependent variables. While Table 1 gave some evidence of increases 
in the Finnish stock values in 1989–1993, firm-specific variables might shed more 
light to the factors behind changes for individual companies. 
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Table 4.   Panel estimation results 
 
Dep. var.  Log(Tobin’s q)  Log(Tobin’s q) Tob vs US  Tob vs US 
Model  Fixed eff.  Random eff.  Fixed eff.  Random eff. 
Constant   0.0114    -0.7477 
  (0.075)    (-1.442) 
Leverage -0.4806***  -0.4278***  -1.0160*  -0.8390 
  (-3.580) (-3.381)  (-1.761)  (-1.620) 
Log (assets)  -0.0406  0.0139  0.2291  0.0739** 
  (-0.899) (1.293)  (1.146)  (2.009) 
Year 91  -0.2474***  -0.2356***  -0.6925***  -0.6478*** 
  (-5.225) (-5.388)  (-4.434)  (-3.406) 
Year 92  -0.2328***  -0.2151***  -1.0303***  -0.9804*** 
  (-4.959) (-5.070)  (-5.202)  (-5.319) 
Year 93  0.0278  0.0515  -0.9631***  -0.9704*** 
  (0.564) (1.300)  (-4.106)  (-5.670) 
Year 91 x Lev  0.4599***  0.4090***  0.7963*  0.6852 
  (3.716) (2.979)  (1.818)  (1.148) 
Year 92 x Lev  0.4611***  0.3926***  1.4759***  1.4018** 
  (3.830) (2.988)  (2.816)  (2.464) 
Year 93 x Lev  0.1891  0.1159  1.1584*  1.1358** 
  (1.506) (0.896)  (1.744)  (2.043) 
        
Adj. R-sq  0.7069  0.1267  0.5670  0.1213 
        
Hausman test p    0.633    0.0000 
Tobin’s q = (total assets - book value of equity + market capitalization)/total assets. Tobin Chg. 
= Tobin’s q year t / Tobin’s q year t-1 – 1. Tob vs US = Tobin’s q – US median Tobin’s q within the 
firm’s two-digit SIC code. Leverage = non-equity liabilities/total assets. Log (assets) = Log 
(total assets). Year 91 and Year 92 = 1 for observations in each year, respectively, zero 
otherwise. Year 91 x Lev and Year 92 x Lev are interaction variables between the year 
dummy variables and Leverage. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
one per cent, five per cent, and ten per cent level, respectively. 
 
 
In the first two columns of Table 4, we report the panel regression results when 
the natural log of Tobin’s q is used as the dependent variable. We control for 
leverage, firm size (Log of total assets), and also for macro effects that took place 
in years 1991, 1992, and 1993 (dummy variables for each year, respectively) on 
Tobin’s q. However, our main interest is in the interaction variables Year 91 x 
leverage, Year 92 x leverage, and Year 93 x leverage. These variables should 
capture the marginal effect of higher leverage on Tobin’s q in each of the three 
years. 
  We report both firm-level fixed effects and random effects results. In the first 
panel regression, Hausman test fails to reject the random effects model, and 
therefore we should focus on the results in column 2. The results in column 2 
suggest a strong positive connection between Tobin’s q and leverage in years 
1991 and 1992. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level or  
22 
better. These results support the wealth transfer view, or the alternative view that 
overly strong creditor protection hampers financial market development. 
  In the last two columns of Table 4, we control for industry-specific changes in 
stock values. We obtain US data within each company’s two-digit SIC code from 
Compustat, and calculate the US industry median for each Finnish firm. The US 
makes a good point of comparison as creditor protection remained unchanged in 
the US during the period of interest. The dependent variable in our last panel 
regression is the difference between the sample firm’s Tobin’s q and its US 
industry median. The Hausman test indicates that we should this time focus on the 
fixed effects model. While the 1991 and 1993 results are only marginally 
significant, year 1992 results exhibit a positive and significant sign, providing 
further backing for the connection between leverage and value changes. 
 
 
5.3 Robustness  checks 
As mentioned above, empirical studies of this nature suffer from the suspicion 
that findings are ultimately driven by some other macroeconomic variables that 
have not been considered in the empirical design. The fact that Finland was living 
through a very deep economic crisis during our sample period heightens such 
suspicion. 
  Finnish banking sector went through a major crisis during the early 1990s. 
While a low number of banks in our sample limits the concern, these bank stocks 
could be biasing our results. In our cross-sectional analysis in Table 3, we utilize a 
dummy variable for financial institutions to control for any extraordinary effects 
caused by such institutions. Also, our event study results reported in Table 2 are 
robust to exclusion of financial institutions, which is shown in the first column of 
Table 5. Each event that was statistically significant in Table 2, receives the same 
sign at the same level of statistical significance when financial institutions are left 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As mentioned above, the stock value increases reported above could be explained 
by a wealth transfer from creditors to shareholders, rather than by value creation. 
To explore this proposition, we rerun the event study tests of Table 2 with a 
portfolio that contains only financial institutions. These results are reported in the 
center column of Table 5. If the overall value gain is explained by a wealth 
transfer, we should expect financial institutions – the predominant creditors in 
Finland at the time – to experience a value reduction upon the law-changing 
events. However, the financial institution portfolio results are very similar to those 
reported in Table 2, with t-statistics of 4.1977 for the September 25, 1992 event.
13 
Finally, we observe the interest rates on corporate lending in Finland during our 
sample period.
14 According to the wealth transfer argument, the law changes 
considered in this paper could potentially affect the cost of bank lending, which 
alone could result in stock valuation changes. As Figure 1 illustrates, no 
significant shifts in the spread between the corporate bank loan rates and the 
prime rate occurred. Lack of reaction on the borrowing side thus further suggests 
that the law changes of 1991–1993 created value, rather than shifting it to 
shareholders from other claimants. 
 
Figure 1.  Spread between corporate loans and 

































































































































Amid the economic crisis in Finland, the European Monetary System experienced 
tumultuous times in 1992, and Finland played a significant role in those 
developments. Speculative attacks on the Finnish Markka caused the Bank of 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, the stock prices of financial institutions do not react positively to the Act on 
Financial Supervisory Authority, like other companies do. Perhaps the reason for this finding is 
that financial institutions were already very closely monitored since the beginning of the banking 
crisis. 
14 The data come from the Bank of Finland.  
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Finland to float the currency on September 8, 1992
15. Since the decision to float 
Markka resulted in an immediate devaluation of the currency by about 15%, the 
stock reaction to the currency regime change might vary depending on whether 
the firm is involved in export trade or not. Therefore, we define a dummy variable 
NONEXP, which takes on value of one for firms that are in the service sector or 
in domestic retail or wholesale trade. 
  In the right-most column of Table 5, we rerun the portfolio method test in 
Table 2 with a portfolio that includes only the NONEXP firms. The results 
regarding September 25, 1992 law change event remain significant, with the t-
statistic of 2.165. As mentioned earlier, same is true for the findings reported in 
Table 3. When only the September 25, 1992 event is included in the cross-
sectional analysis, the t-statistic for LEVERAGE is 1.954, even though the sample 
size is smaller when the export firms are excluded (results not reported). 
  Annual data used in our panel estimation is more likely to reflect effects of 
the currency regime change. Therefore, we re-estimate the models in Table 4 with 
additional interaction variables added, and the results are reported in Table 6.  The 
added variables, YEAR 91 x NONEXP, YEAR 92 x NONEXP, and YEAR 93 x 
NONEXP enter with negative signs, the findings regarding years 1992 and 1993 
being statistically significant. This suggests that stock values in non-export sectors 
suffered from the currency regime change, as expected. However, when Table 6 
results are compared to those reported in Table 4, very little change can be 
detected regarding the effect of leverage on value change. 
  Another significant change in the Finnish financial market regulation during 
our study period was the removal of the restrictions on the foreign investment in 
the Finnish stock market in 1993. While we do not have data on foreign 
ownership of our sample companies, we attempt to control for the effect of the 
liberation of foreign ownership with an additional set of interaction variables 
between the year dummy variables and total assets. This is based on an assertion 
that larger firms are likely to attract more foreign investors (as documented by 
Kang and Stulz, 1997, for example). Adding these additional interaction variables 
to the specifications reported in Table 5 leaves our findings intact, while the 
coefficients on the added interaction variables are weakly positive (results not 
reported). 
 
                                                 
15 Some minor changes in the wording of this currency regime change were even introduced to the 
parliament on September 25, 1992 – the same day when two of the four law changes studied in 
this paper were also introduced to the parliament. The prevailing law allowed the Bank of Finland 
to float the currency temporarily. The proposed modification implied that the Bank of Finland 
could, besides floating the currency temporarily, also ask the government’s permission to float the 
currency permanently.  
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Table 6.   Panel estimation with non-export industry 
     indicators 
 
Dep. var.  Log(Tobin’s q)  Log(Tobin’s q)  Tob vs US  Tob vs US 
Model  Fixed eff.  Random eff.  Fixed eff.  Random eff. 
       
Constant   0.0792    -0.6234 
   (0.525)    (-1.186) 
Leverage -0.3975***  -0.3615***  -0.3340  -0.4947 
  (-2.786) (-2.820)  (-0.499)  (-0.940) 
Log (assets)  -0.0688  0.0080  0.0367  0.0590 
  (-1.503) (0.737)  (0.179)  (1.579) 
Year 91  -0.2437***  -0.2327***  -0.5595***  -0.5626*** 
  (-5.012) (-4.850)  (-2.995)  (-2.678) 
Year 92  -0.1882***  -0.1745***  -0.8220***  -0.8558*** 
  (-3.897) (-3.735)  (-3.860)  (-4.205) 
Year 93  0.1006*  0.1248***  -0.4569*  -0.5018*** 
  (1.764) (2.716)  (-1.887)  (-2.531) 
Year 91 x Lev  0.4749***  0.4254***  0.5388  0.4620 
  (3.694) (3.017)  (1.132)  (0.746) 
Year 92 x Lev  0.4558***  0.3951***  1.2007**  1.2441** 
  (3.559) (2.942)  (2.146)  (2.123) 
Year 93 x Lev  0.1119  0.0506  0.5267  0.7042 
  (0.822) (0.380)  (0.753)  (1.225) 
Year 91 x 
Nonexp -0.0311  -0.0328  -0.2103  -0.1026 
  (-0.739) (-0.810)  (-1.238)  (-0.589) 
Year 92 x 
Nonexp  -0.1262*** -0.1238***  -0.4258**  -0.2868* 
  (-2.712) (-3.049)  (-2.048)  (-1.657) 
Year 93 x 
Nonexp  -0.1004** -0.1080***  -0.7618***  -0.7879*** 
  (-1.973) (-2.655)  (-2.738)  (-4.565) 
        
Adj. R-sq  0.7197  0.1469  0.5864  0.1390 
       
Hausman test p    0.0000    0.9755 
Tobin’s q = (total assets - book value of equity + market capitalization)/total assets. Tobin Chg. = 
Tobin’s q year t / Tobin’s q year t-1 – 1. Tob vs US = Tobin’s q – US median Tobin’s q within the 
firm’s two-digit SIC code. Leverage = non-equity liabilities/total assets. Log (assets) = Log (total 
assets). Year 91 and Year 92 = 1 for observations in each year, respectively, zero otherwise. 
Year 91 x Lev and Year 92 x Lev are interaction variables between the year dummy variables 
and Leverage. Nonexp is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for firms that are in 
service, domestic wholesale, or domestic retail industries. T-statistics (in parentheses) are 
calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 




6  Political economy of the reforms 
Current level of financial development is not permanent, as shown by Rajan and 
Zingales (2003, 2004). Finland is an excellent example of this. Rajan and Zingales 
argue that financial markets will develop only when a country’s political structure 
changes or incumbents allow development to take place. The Finnish case also 
illustrates the benefits of legal reform of corporate governance and its obstacles 
arising from interest group politics as emphasized by La Porta et al (2000). The 
subsequent literature of political economy and corporate governance tries to 
further isolate the reasons of why and how investor protection laws and financial 
development evolve as a result of political process. In Pagano and Volpin (2005, 
2006), workers align themselves with existing owners against outside financiers 
when workers do not participate in stock markets, resulting in low level of 
investor protection and high level of employment protection. Similarly, Perotti 
and von Thadden (2006) show that median voters are likely to support 
conservative bank-dominated financial system when they do not own stocks, but 
switch to supporting more risky market-based financial system when they become 
owners. 
  The mechanism for major reforms in Finland can be seen as the opposite of 
that in Pagano and Volpin (2005, 2006) and Perotti and von Thadden (2006), 
which would both predict that major reforms occur after workers or median voters 
have increased their stock ownership. In Finland, the reforms were preceded by 
workers’ rents first dissipating through higher unemployment. After that legal 
reforms became possible as workers had nothing to lose and perhaps something to 
gain in the future from improved shareholder protection laws. 
  The developments in Finland during the early 1990s fit better the crisis-
induced-reform hypothesis (see, eg chapter 10 in Drazen, 2000, and Drazen and 
Easterly, 2001). The traditional version of the hypothesis maintains that a 
sufficiently severe economy-wide crisis launches macroeconomic policy reforms. 
By restricting the availability of external finance to firms, a macroeconomic crisis 
may also induce a reform of corporate governance laws, since the economic and 
political costs of postponing it would be significant. Moreover, the 
macroeconomic crisis may disturb the balance of power between interest groups 
supporting and opposing the reform, which was the case in Finland, as previously 
powerful labor and banking sectors lost some of their political power due to the 
crisis. 
  Since the economic crisis took place in the aftermath of liberalization of 
capital flows, the events in Finland also fit well the theory advanced by Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) that predicts that reforms and financial market development occur 
in an economy that has opened its borders to both trade and capital flows. 
Whether the Finnish legal reforms in 1991–1993 were caused primarily by  
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economic crisis or liberalization of capital flows is a question beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, the pace at which the reforms went through the legislative 
process suggests that the depth of the economic crisis was the major contributing 




This paper shows that the major legal reforms in Finland have lead to higher 
corporate valuations. We study two kinds of legal reforms: those that increase 
shareholder protection by improving public enforcement of securities market laws 
and those that weaken creditors’ rights by facilitating reorganization of distressed 
companies. We show that both kinds of reforms lead to positive abnormal returns 
when the bills are introduced to the parliament, but only the latter reforms lead to 
more positive abnormal returns for levered firms. We obtain consistent results 
with panel regressions, where the dependent variable is the Tobin’s q: more 
levered firms experience a higher increase in q. 
  The typical empirical study into investor protection laws uses cross-sectional 
data in an attempt to show that good investor protection and high stock prices are 
positively correlated. In these studies, the causation could go either way: high 
level if investor protection could indeed lead to high stock valuations, but it could 
be equally plausible that high stock valuations improve corporate governance, 
thus leading to good investor protection. Moreover, it is not a priori clear whether 
strong creditor protection is conducive for financial market development or not. 
Since we use the event study methodology, and the legal reforms were introduced 
in the midst of a deep recession when the stock prices were also in doldrums, we 
are able show that improved shareholder and weakened creditor protection laws 
indeed lead to higher stock prices and not vice versa. We deem this to be the 
major contribution of our paper. 
  Our study also has bearings on the debate about whether public enforcement 
matters for financial market development. Based on cross-sectional data, the 
existing research suggests that public enforcement does not improve financial 
market development. Our results contrast this view: we find evidence that the 
stock market welcomed the introduction of an independent Financial Services 
Authority. 
  The severe economic crisis also sheds light on the politics of corporate 
governance reforms. The crisis took place in the aftermath of capital market 
liberalization, which has then been blamed for the crisis. However, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) suggest that capital market liberalization in an open economy 
such as Finland should be conducive for financial market development, since 
incumbents have little reasons or capabilities to resist reforms. During the crisis  
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bankruptcies reached unprecedented levels and Finnish banks were struggling. 
The banking crisis implied a deterioration of banks’ traditionally strong industrial 
and political power. They were in a weak position to oppose the substantial 
worsening of creditor rights which seemed to run against their interests. 
Moreover, their traditional clients, the established industrial firms, were either on 
the verge of bankruptcy or tapping foreign markets for cheaper finance, and so the 
banks needed to seek new profit opportunities among new entrepreneurs and 
younger firms. Since the incumbent financial institutions had no information 
advantage in new markets, they were gaining from stronger public supervision, 
and the creation of the new Financial Supervisory Authority was also in their 
interests. 
  From the ruins of Finland’s previously bank-dominated financial system 
emerged a more equity finance-oriented system that has served Finnish companies 
well. The next logical step is to examine changes in equity issuance, in particular 
IPOs, ownership concentrations and dividend policies in Finland before and after 
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In this appendix we document and justify the changes in the values of five 
investor protection indices reported in section 2. Four of the indices deal with 
creditor rights and one deals with shareholder rights. Since the creditor rights 
were more heavily shaped by the reforms, we also explain their determinants 
more in detail than in the main text. 
 
 
Changes in the creditor rights 
 
Prior to the reforms of the 1990s, creditor rights in Finland were largely 
determined by the Liquidation Bankruptcy Code 31/1868 (effective 9 Nov 1868), 
the Decree on Claim Priorities 32/1868 (effective 9 Nov 1868), the Act on 
Compositions 148/1932 (effective 10 May 1932), and the Companies Act 
734/1978 (effective 1 Jan 1980). The three new creditor right laws introduced in 
the early 1990s were: the Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy 758/1991 
(effective 1 Jan 1992), the Act on Claim Priorities 1578/1992 (effective 1 Jan 
1993), and the Act on Reorganization of Companies 47/1993 (effective 8 Feb 
1993). All new laws are relevant for our coding of the indices, although our 
analysis in the main body of the text focuses on the Act on Reorganization of 
Companies and the Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy. As we argue 
below, only these two laws resulted in changes in the creditor rights index values. 
  The most well known of the indices we study is the creditor rights index 
developed by La Porta et al (1998). It consists of four binary variables, each of 
which obtains value one if the law includes the provision and zero otherwise. The 
four variables are i) Restrictions for going into reorganization; ii) No automatic 
stay on secured assets; iii) Secured creditors ranked first; and iv) Management 
does not stay in reorganization. All four variables were touched by the reforms as 
indicated below. 
 
i)  Restrictions for going into reorganization. Equals one if the reorganization 
procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditor’s consent to file for 
reorganization; equals zero if there are no such restrictions. 
 
Our coding: The reforms reduce the variable value from 1 to 0. 
 
Justification: Before the Act on Reorganization of Companies of 1993, 
reorganization procedure was unknown in Finland. In theory the closest 
equivalent was compositions of creditors, regulated by the Act of Compositions of 
1932, in which junior unsecured creditors agreed to accept partial payment in full  
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settlement of their claims. An alternative, and in practice much more common 
route of resolution, was liquidation bankruptcy, governed by the Liquidation 
Bankruptcy Code of 1868. However, the goal of liquidation is fundamentally 
different than reorganization and, hence, it is not a proper point of reference here. 
This view is also shared by the Finnish lawmakers who explicitly made 
compositions rather than liquidation as the reference point to which the proposed 
reorganization procedure were assessed (Government bill 182/1992). 
  The Act of Compositions dictated that compositions procedure could not be 
started without an approval by a majority of junior creditors. However, the 
participation of senior secured creditors in compositions was entirely voluntary 
and required waiving of their priority. Because La Porta et al’s creditor right index 
should be coded from the perspective of senior secured creditors, it is clear that 
the index value is one before the reform. 
  The Act on Reorganization of Companies replaced the Act of Compositions. 
There are some restrictions (6–7§) for going into reorganization: The procedure 
can be started only if the debtor together with creditors representing at least one 
fifth of total claims apply for it or if the debtor is either insolvent or threatened by 
insolvency. Because senior secured debt could not, without permission, be 
subjected to compositions but could be subjected to reorganization, we judge that 
the reform reduced the value of this variable from 1 to 0. Arguably, the index 
value could perhaps remain one, but it is clear that the reform substantially 
weakened the senior creditors’ control over the initiation of debt rescheduling 
process. Zero is also the value for Finland reported by La Porta et al (1998) 
 
ii)  No automatic stay on secured assets. Equals one if the reorganization 
procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of the firm filing for 
the reorganization petition. Equals zero if such a restriction does exist in the law. 
 
Our coding: The reforms reduce the variable value from 1 to 0. 
 
Justification: The Act on Reorganization of Companies (17§) states that the 
debtor is prohibited from paying debt upon entering into reorganization. Only the 
interest on senior secured debt can be paid (18§). Neither can any collateralized 
assets be seized to recover the debt (19§, 21§). These provisions automatically 
enter in force once reorganization process begins. Prior to the reform, the situation 
was different, because composition procedure did not concern senior secured debt. 
While the Act of Compositions imposed restrictions on creditors’ ability to 
recover their debt during a compositions procedure, they did not apply to secured 
assets. For these reasons, the introduction of the Act of Reorganization of 
Companies changed the index value from 1 to zero. La Porta et al (1998) also 
report the value of Finland to be equal to zero. 
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iii) Secured creditors first. Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the 
distribution of the proceeds that result form the disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm. Equals zero if unsecured creditors, such as the government and 
workers, are given absolute priority. 
 
Our coding: The variable value is 1 and it was unaffected by the reforms. 
 
Justification: While the Act on Reorganization (18§) gave priority to workers’ 
salaries in reorganization, the Act did not affect the priority rankings in 
liquidation bankruptcy. These priorities were reformed at the same time by the 
Act on Claim Priorities of 1993, which simplified the complex priority rankings 
derived from the Decree on Claim Priorities of 1868. The Decree implied that a 
secured creditor had a ‘special’ priority right to the collateralized asset backing 
the claim but if the asset was insufficient to recover the full value of the debt, the 
secured creditor had no priority over other groups holding ‘general’ priority rights 
such as government and workers. In the reform all numerous general priorities 
(except for maintenance allowance) were abolished and even maintenance 
allowance was strictly placed below the collateralized debt in the ranking. While 
the reform improved the position of senior secured creditors, they held absolute 
priority rights to collateralized assets already before the reform. Hence, our view 
is that the reform did not change the variable value. La Porta et al (1998) also 
report the value of one for Finland. However, there is potential for confusion, 
since La Porta et al (1998, p. 1135) suggest that the variable should assess the 
secured creditors’ right to collateral in reorganization rather than in liquidation 
bankruptcy. 
 
iv) Management does not stay. Equals one when an official appointed by the 
court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the operation of the business during 
reorganization. Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not keep 
the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization 
process. Equals zero otherwise. 
 
Our coding: The reforms reduce the variable value from 1 to 0. 
 
Justification: The purpose of the Act of Reorganization of Companies is to keep 
the debtor or management in charge of daily business operations of a company 
and the company’s assets during reorganization (29§). There are restrictions on 
the debtor’s and management’s authority over the use of a company’s property, 
assets and liabilities in such a way that would hurt creditors interest (29–30§). The 
Act also requires the courts to appoint an official to monitor the debtor and 
management to protect creditors’ rights (8§). Despite the restrictions, however, it 
is clear that the index value is zero after the reform.  
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  To assess the situation before the establishment of the proper reorganization 
procedure is difficult. Neither the management nor the debtor was able to control 
the company’s assets during liquidation procedure but remained in control during 
composition procedure. Above we suggest that the right point of reference is the 
composition procedure, in which case the right index value would be zero also 
prior to the reform. However, compositions were rare because main (secured) 
creditors were unwilling participate in them and preferred liquidation. Moreover, 
since compositions did not pertain to senior secured debt, which is the base for 
coding, the reform enabled the debtor or management to control collateralized 
assets in reorganization. It is thus justifiable to think that the index value was 1 
before the introduction of the Act of Reorganization of Companies, and that the 
introduction changed the value of the variable from 1 to 0. Zero is the value also 
in La Porta et al (1998). 
 
v) Legal Reserve. This is the fifth creditor protection variable coded by La Porta 
et al (1998). It is given by the minimum percentage of total share capital 
mandated by corporate law to avoid the dissolution of an existing firm. The value 
of this variable is continuous and it is not part of their creditor rights index. The 
variable was beyond the scope of the reforms of the early 1990s, since this 
provision was included in the Companies Act of 1978 (Ch. 13, 2§). 
  The other three creditor protection indices we study are developed by Pistor 
(2000) and Pistor et al (2000). With respect to these indices, we below focus on 
the changes in the aggregate index values rather than go though the variables one 
by one. 
 
LLSVcr index, ie, the extended La Porta et al creditor right index, includes all four 
variables from La Porta et al and their additional variable, legal reserve, 
transformed to a discrete form. The legal reserve variable obtains value 0.5 if a 
simple majority is required and 1 for a qualified majority. 
 
Our coding: The reforms reduce the index value from 4 to 1. 
 
Justification: We code the value of the discrete legal reserve variable to be zero in 
the case of Finland, since the legal reserve only amounted to one third of total 
shares (Companies Act 734/1978, Ch. 13, 2§). As mentioned, there was no change 
in this variable. So this index should take exactly the same values as the basic La 
Porta et al’s creditor right index. 
 
CREDCON index, which aims at measuring creditors’ control of bankruptcy 
process, includes five variables. Three variables come from La Porta et al 
(variables ii–iv) from above). In addition, there are two new variables: automatic  
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trigger to file for a bankruptcy and creditors’ consent required for an adoption of 
liquidation or a reorganization plan. 
 
Our coding: The reforms reduce the index value from 3 to 1. 
 
Justification: The implementation of a reorganization plan under the Act on 
Reorganization of Companies is much easier the implementation of a 
compositions proposal under the Act on Compositions. However, the reform did 
not affect the requirements for adopting a liquidation plan. 
  The question of whether and when one should or could file for a bankruptcy 
were in turn covered by the Liquidation Bankruptcy Code of 1868 and the 
Companies Act of 1978, which were also untouched by the reforms. So the 
change in the index value is entirely driven by the change in the La Porta et al’s 
creditor right index variables ii) and iv). 
 
REMEDY index, which measures rules that empower creditors with ex post 
control rights, consists of three variables: i) Legal provision that allow creditors to 
pierce the corporate veil; ii) The management can be held viable for violating the 
provisions of insolvency law (lower threshold than criminal activities required) 
and iii) transactions preceding the opening of the bankruptcy process can be 
declared null an void. The two first variables are binary variables but the third 
variable takes values 0.25, 0.5., 0.75 or 1 if transactions up to 3, 6, 12 or more 
than 12 months, respectively, prior to bankruptcy can be annulled. 
 
Our coding: The reforms raised the index value from 1.5 to 2. 
 
Justification: The Act on Restitution of Assets in Bankruptcy of 1991 changed 
value of the third variable. Preceding the Act, the Liquidation Bankruptcy Code 
postulated several time limits concerning revoking transactions that occur prior to 
the beginning of the bankruptcy process. For example, the transactions could be 
cancelled up to one year before the launch of bankruptcy process if they were 
taken by management or other insiders closely tied to the bankrupt company. But 
the limit was only six months for transactions by others. The reform raised these 
limits to three and one years, respectively. Therefore we argue that the variable 
value changed from 0.5 to 1. One could argue for the value of one already prior to 
the reform. However, while the issue is debatable before the reform, the 
conditions for the value of one are clearly satisfied after the reform. Therefore, a 




Changes in shareholder rights 
 
The reforms of the early 1990 did not affect the shareholder indices developed by 
La Porta et al (1998) but they did affect Pistor et al’ s stock market integrity index 
(SMINTEGR) measuring the protection of market liquidity. It consists of six 
variables: i) Conflict of interest rules, including rules on disclosing conflict and 
abstaining from voting are included in the law; ii) Shareholder register must be 
conducted by an independent firm (not by issuing company); iii) Insider trading 
prohibited by law; iv) Acquisitions of larger blocs of shares triggers mandatory 
disclosure (threshold); v) A state agency conducts capital market supervision; vi) 
Capital market supervision is formally independent. 
 
Our coding: The reforms raised the index value from 5 to 6. 
 
Justification: The Act on Financial Supervision Authority of 1993 changed the 
sixth variable. Since the year 1989 capital markets were supervised by the 
Banking Supervision Agency, which operated under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance. The creation of the FSA made capital market supervision independent 
from government. The FSA operates in connection with the Bank of Finland and 
both the FSA and the Bank of Finland are directly overseen by the Parliament. We 
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